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Abstract:	   The	  paper	  discusses	   an	  energy	  policy	   instrument	   that	  was	   introduced	   in	   the	  
power	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  inefficient	  in-­‐group	  electricity	  trading	  that	  was	  a	  source	  
of	   soaring	   electricity	   prices.	   The	   remedy	  was	   especially	   tailored	   to	   correct	   the	  market	  
failure	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  Polish	  power	  market	  as	  a	  result	  of	  both:	  (i)	  the	  termination	  
of	  Long	  Term	  Contracts	  and	  (ii)	  the	  governmentally	  steered	  consolidation	  of	  the	  power	  
sector	   that	   also	   involved	   vertical	   integration.	   Several	   behavioural	   and	   structural	  
instruments	   are	   considered	   and	   the	   reasoning	   supporting	   selection	   of	   the	   most	  
appropriate	  one	  is	  given.	  The	  outcomes	  of	  qualitative	  analysis	  confirm	  that	  the	  remedy	  
applied,	  namely	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  PX	  duty	  to	  trade	  into	  the	  Polish	  Energy	  Law,	  was	  
a	   successful	   market	   reform.	   The	   research	   carried	   out	   in	   this	   paper	   contributes	   to	  
scientific	   knowledge	  on	   regulatory	  and	  policy	   issues	  and	   the	   solutions	  adopted	  can	  be	  
considered	  as	  one	  of	  possible	  solutions	  of	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  
and	  liquidity	  of	  power	  markets.	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1 Introduction 
Building common electricity and gas markets is the long term goal of 
the EU’s liberalisation directives (2009/72, 2009/73). The main measures 
applied to achieve such goals are unbundling, Third Party Access (TPA) 
and transparency requirements. Execution of those tools is entrusted to a 
network of public bodies, consisting of the EC Commission, Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) acting in cooperation with antitrust and financial 
authorities as well as central governments. It is of particular interest that 
legal instruments in the sector specific regulation of the electricity market 
are quite often borrowed from antitrust theory and practice. On the other 
hand, antitrust authorities sometimes cross the boundaries of competition 
law enforcement, using remedies that actively create (or even regulate) the 
markets. Our paper analyses a specific instrument, joining in its origin 
crosspieces of antitrust and sector specific regulation. The analysis of an 
instrument that we call duty to trade on the power exchange (hereinafter: 
PX duty to trade) is a contribution to the wider discussion on antitrust 
mechanisms and regulatory remedies such as Virtual Power Plant (VPP) 
auctions or electricity (gas) release programmes. We argue that although 
specific, the PX duty to trade belongs to the same family of pro-market 
remedies. 
In the institutional dimension, the legal systems of Member States 
follow the EU liberalisation directives, regulating for measures that 
usually strictly implement those directives rather than using a method of 
regulatory innovation. However, every national or regional electricity 
market is characterised by specific unique features determined by 
historical, technical and economic factors, that should be taken into 
account by governments and NRAs, create the basis for regulatory 
innovation (of course within the goals of EU law) and thus adequately 
respond to the problems of particular markets. We believe that we have 
found and analysed specific market conditions that were the basis for 
adopting an innovative approach leading to achieving such a goal as a 
more liquid and transparent wholesale electricity market. That innovative 
approach has resulted in the adoption of a legislative instrument that was 
not explicitly listed among instruments available for NRAs in the EU 
market directives (2009/72/EC, 2009/73/EC), though as far as it leads to 
more transparency and liquidity of the wholesale market, it holds to the 
goals of these directives. In this respect, despite the specific market 
situation and solution we analyse, our article can be considered as an 
argument for an innovative approach to regulation and regulatory 
flexibility as a way of achieving a common electricity market. From the 
point of view of the EU energy policy, the subject of our analysis is 
important, as the duty to trade on the gas exchanges was a part of Polish 
proposal of so called the Energy Union. In this respect, our analysis may 
also contribute to a wider discussion on regulation of energy utilities in 
the EU law and policy. 
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Insider (in-group) trading by vertically integrated energy companies is 
a common feature of energy markets. As far as transparency and liquidity 
of the market are concerned, such a situation is not desirable as it allows 
the generation of extraordinary profits and creates barriers to entry. 
Insider trading in monopolistic as well as in oligopolistic markets raises 
the question of the rationale of regulatory intervention. Responding to the 
serious competition restraints caused by insider trading, the regulator 
should have an opportunity to intervene using the regulatory tools 
available in order to intensify the liquidity of the market while not 
drastically restricting the choice of electricity market (bilateral, power 
exchange, balancing). In this respect regulatory powers should allow the 
regulator to respond proportionally with respect to specific market 
conditions. In our article, we analyse various legal tools with the intention 
of evaluating their appropriateness for responding to a situation of lack of 
liquidity and transparency in the wholesale electricity market.    
Although the problem investigated in our paper has never been 
discussed in the international literature to the best of our knowledge, there 
have been many papers dealing with market reforms and the function of 
power exchanges. An interesting and up to date review on the lessons that 
could be drawn from the liberalisation of electricity markets in the context 
of the transition to a low carbon energy system was recently carried out by 
(Pollitt, 2012). As he also provides a concise outlook on the liberalisation 
processes, we deliberately omit this issue from our paper and kindly 
direct the reader to his paper where several references are also given. 
As far as power exchanges, which are the focus of our paper, are 
concerned, (Singh, 2010) analysed the initial phase of power market 
reforms in the Indian energy sector focusing on the efforts undertaken to 
introduce a competitive wholesale and retail market. The paper also 
examined the role of traders and power exchanges in a market dominated 
by long-term contracts. (Meeus, 2011) addressed the problem of the 
regulation of power exchanges identifying two types of power exchange: 
(i) merchant and (ii) cost-of-service regulated. The Polish Power Exchange 
belongs to the first group. Arguable views on competitive trading in the 
spot market were developed by (Graf and Wozabal, 2013) who 
investigated the day-ahead market at one of the most important power 
exchanges in Central Europe, the EPEX. They applied the conjectural 
variations approach in order to analyse market power in the electricity 
market. (Nakajima, 2013) investigated the wholesale Japan Electric Power 
Exchange bringing attention to spot price formation on the exchange. 
(Meeus et al., 2009) discussed market coupling emphasizing the 
importance of price coordination between power exchanges in 
international wholesale trading arrangements. In the case of the Polish 
Power Exchange, detailed information on its regulation, trading rules and 
functioning can be found on the webpage: http://www.polpx.pl/en. 
Furthermore, one of the very few papers analysing day-ahead electricity 
prices on the Polish Power Exchange was carried out by (Bobinaite et al., 
2013). Although (Bobinaite et al., 2013) paper investigates price 
developments, the issue of the introduction of new regulations was not 
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considered. Therefore, our paper contributes to electricity regulation and 
the literature on policy with a strong emphasis on the impact of energy 
regulators on market design. Another crucial contribution of our paper is 
that it not only describes the theoretical aspects of correcting market 
failures, but it also discusses practical solutions based on the experience 
gained at the Energy Regulatory Office in Poland, which could be of use 
for other practitioners.  
The power sector before electricity market re–design in 2009-2010 – the 
problem emerges 
The Polish power industry has gone through a number of takeovers 
and mergers since the transformation that started in the late in 1980s. One 
of the first consolidations happened in 2000 – the government 
consolidated six State-owned power plants and two combined heat and 
power plants (CHPs). As a result the Southern Energy Company was 
established the biggest power generation company of installed capacity at 
around 5 GW (a 14% market share). The next consolidation took place in 
2004 and involved merging of three power plants: Be1chatów SA Opole 
SA and Turów SA. As a result BOT Mining and Energy Company was 
established. The total installed capacity of BOT was to 7.9 GW (market 
share of 22.5%). The next consolidation of the Polish power sector1 that 
was carried out in 2006–2008 as a consequence of the Government’s 
Programme for the Power Sector (2006) led to the creation of four 
State-owned energy companies. As expected consolidation of the power 
sector has led to a significant increase in the potential for market power in 
the power sector, and this is confirmed by a dramatic increase in the 
Concentration Ratios and the HHI (see (Kaminski, 2012)). In terms of 
ownership, they could be briefly described as both being state owned, and 
receiving an uneven part of generation assets. One of those consolidated 
companies, PGE SA, was given a substantial share of the low cost 
generation sector based on brown coal combustion. On top of that, PGE 
SA came to own approx. 40% of total capacity as a result of the 
introduction of the Programme. That clearly could not be interpreted as a 
step towards increasing competition in the electricity market. The transfer 
of cheap brown coal-based power generation assets to a company with 
such a high market share gives this company a competitive advantage. 
The consolidation of the Polish power sector coincided with the process 
of termination of long-term contracts. Their share in the electricity trade 
was very high at that time (see Fig. 1), and this market reform was aimed 
at increasing the share of competitively traded electricity. Without freeing 
electricity from LTAs, there was no space for competitive trade. The 
withdrawal of LTAs and the mechanisms for compensation for stranded 
costs were initially perceived as successful. 
 
                                                
1 As the Polish power sector, which is the subject of the case discussed in this paper, has 
already been described in the international literature, we deliberately omit further 
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Fig.	   1.	   The	   Share	   of	   LTAs	   in	   Total	   Wholesale	   Electricity	   Trade	   with	   Respect	   to	  
Aggregates	  of	  Power	  Producers	  [%]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
Unfortunately, the introduction of those two crosscurrent reforms 
(consolidation and termination of LTAs) has quickly led to the 
malfunctioning of the power market. What happened was that power 
generation companies operating within vertically integrated energy 
groups started trading most of their electricity with electricity trading 
companies that were in the same capital groups. Although that should not 
be a problem per se, the real problem was that the prices in those contracts 
were significantly different from the prices in a competitive market (ERO, 
2009) (ERO, 2010). This adverse effect of the termination of the LTAs has 
prompted the search for a policy tool that would help to correct this 
clearly identified market failure. It was even more urgent as a sharp 
increase in costs that would be incurred by industrial customers was 
expected due to the erroneous assumptions in the electricity price 
forecasts used in the development of the LTA termination programme.   
When the reforms described above were introduced it was decided to 
remove the obligation to gain approval for the retail electricity tariff from 
the President of the Energy Regulatory Office (PERO). This decision was 
however rescinded because of the serious doubts regarding competition 
concerns, lack of liquidity and transparency of the electricity market. . The 
result was that electricity prices have increased dramatically, but only for 
non-retail consumers and energy-intensive industries were particularly 
affected. One of consequences of high electricity prices was the closure of 
an aluminium plant and protests by workers at other factories (see: Konin 
Aluminium Plant). The power exchange, which belongs to the commodity 
exchanges, is regulated in Poland in a separate legislation regime. In 
Poland, despite the existence of several wholesale energy trading 
platforms, the only one that was used by market participants was POLPX 
(Polish Power Exchange, in Polish: Towarowa Giełda Energii SA) in 
Warsaw. Initially it was a power exchange founded by market 
participants. Later, as a result of acquisition, it became an exchange owned 
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by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Its activities are currently as follows 
(POLPX): 
 
1. management  of  the  commodity  exchange,  supporting  the  trading  of  
electrical  power,  liquid  and  gas  fuels,  production  limits,  more  particularly  
electrical   power   production,   pollution   emission   limits,   property   rights  
(electrical   power   values,   liquid   or   gas   fuels,   production   or   emission  
limits);  
2. clearing  of  exchange  and  OTC  transactions;  
3. management   of   a   register   for   certificates   of   origin   (renewable  
energy  sources);  
4. management  of  a  register  for  certificates  of  origin  (co-­‐‑generation).  
 
An insignificant share of trading in the power exchange was not 
accidental, as it was not an attractive marketplace for generators and 
wholesale traders, neither before the consolidation, nor after. As 
previously indicated, the consolidated energy companies very quickly 
came to the conclusion that trade within groups is the easiest way to 
increase profits. Higher electricity prices in in-group trading led directly to 
higher prices in the tariffs for final consumers, hence leading to 
extraordinary profits. It is therefore a classic example of market failure 
and negative externalities caused by the lack of implementation of the 
relevant regulatory solutions following the termination of LTAs and the 
consolidation of the energy sector. The problem was serious, which could 
be confirmed by the fact that in 2009 and 2010 the share of in-group trade 
was around 70-80% (Fig. 2), both in the case of hard and brown coal-based 
power producers.  
 
Fig.	  2.	  The	  Share	  of	  Electricity	  Trade	  within	  the	  Same	  Energy	  Group	  [%]	  
 
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	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The only exception was PGE, which, due to its large excess production 
capacity, had to sell energy outside the group. In 2009, under bilateral 
agreements, generators sold over 90% of electricity to trading companies. 
Other markets were the balancing market (run by the TSO – Polish Power 
Grid Company) and, to a very small extent, the power exchange (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig.	  3.	  Destinations	  of	  Electricity	  Sold	  by	  the	  Power	  Generation	  Sector	  in	  2009	  [%]	  
	  
Source:	  (ERO,	  2013)	  
 
As previously mentioned, the way electricity was traded directly 
translated to the level of the wholesale price of electricity. In the case of 
electricity produced by hard coal generators the average price of electricity 
increased from approximately 42.4 EUR/MWh in 2007 to 54.9 EUR/MWh 
in 2009 (i.e. by 30%), and then declined slightly to 52.2 EUR/MWh in 2010. 
Similarly, the prices of electricity generated in brown coal-based power 
plants (operated by PGE SA and ZE PAK SA) increased from around 39.2 
EUR/MWh in 2007 to 49.7 EUR/MWh in 2009 (i.e. 27%) (Fig. 4). In both 
cases, the prices in the wholesale market increased by about 30% within 
two years, which was a phenomenon that had not been observed in the 
Polish energy sector. 
 
Fig.	  4.	  Annual	  Average	  Price	  of	  Electricity	  [€2012/MWh]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	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While searching for the reasons of such a significant increase in 
electricity prices, a natural step seems to be an analysis of generation costs. 
Consequently, during the period 2007-2009 analysed, the Long Run 
Marginal Costs (LRMC) of power generation in hard coal-fired power 
plants did indeed increase from 35.1 EUR/MWh in 2007 to 48.8 
EUR/MWh (by 39%) (Fig.5). This increase could easily be explained by 
soaring fuel costs resulting from an immense increase in hard coal prices 
in the world coal market. In consequence the fuel costs increased from 21.0 
EUR/MWh to 32.7 EUR/MWh (by 56%) between 2007 and 2009 (Fig. 4) 
which was a direct result of the change in fuel prices seen in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig.	  5.	  Average	  Annual	  LRMC	  [€2012/MWh]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
While the increase in electricity prices of hard coal-fired power 
producers could be partially explained by exposure to very high hard coal 
prices, it is very difficult to apply the same reasoning to brown coal-fired 
generators. Owing to the fact that brown coal is exploited exclusively for 
power plants located close to open cast mines, they are independent from 
world coal market price fluctuations and they should be able to offer far 
lower and more stable prices (Grudziński, 2010). However, the price of 
power produced from brown-coal increased from 39.2 EUR/MWh in 2007 
to 49.7 EUR/MWh in 2009 (Fig. 2), which is by approx. 27%, a similar 
figure to that noted for power produced from hard coal. A similar analysis 
of the LRMC discloses an increase from 29.5 EUR/MWh in 2007 to 32.6 
EUR/MWh (Fig. 5), which is only by 11%. Furthermore, the fuel costs 
increased only by 15% (from 16.8 EUR/MWh in 2007 to 19.3 EUR/MWh 
in 2009) (Fig. 6), which is also confirmed by the almost negligible increase 
in brown coal prices seen in Fig. 7. 
Thus, brown coal-fired power producers took advantage of their 
position and increased the prices of electricity above the levels of normal 
profits, and since the wholesale electricity market was already deregulated 
it was almost impossible to take action to quickly improve the situation. 
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Although such a situation required a solution at the national level, the 
government was not willing to introduce an instrument that would 
increase the transparency of electricity trade and lead to price reductions, 
and it was the President of the Energy Regulatory Office who replied to 
the requests of the energy intensive sector on this issue. The problem he 
faced was the lack of appropriate legal measures to introduce necessary 
systemic changes or to moderate the market behaviour of market players, 
so the only way was to introduce the changes needed into the Energy law. 
 
Fig.	  6.	  Fuel	  Costs	  [€2012/MWh]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
Fig.	  7.	  Fuel	  Prices	  in	  Supplies	  to	  the	  Power	  Sector	  [€2012/GJ]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the methods that were applied to correct market failures in the Polish 
power sector outlined in section 1. Relevant policy tools that could be 
considered in the process of improving competition in the power sector 
were compared and analysed, and the most appropriate one is chosen. 
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The regulatory and legislative aspects of PX duty to trade are analysed as 
well. Section 3 discusses the results – the consequences and outcomes of 
the introduction of the remedy into Polish Energy Law. The conclusions 
and key policy findings are summarised in section 4. 
2 Methods and Data 
2.1 Competition Law Remedies in the Wholesale Electricity 
Markets and Sector Specific Regulations 
 
As regards the methods that were applied to solve the problem 
outlined in section 1 we decided to use the Law and Economics approach 
and consider the assumptions involved in and economic effects of 
adopting specific legal measures. In other words, we analyse the outcomes 
of the introduction of legal rules introducing PX duty to trade (descriptive 
Law and Economics) with a view to providing a practical guide to 
policymakers, who face the problem of liberalisation of the wholesale 
energy market (normative Law and Economics) (Posner, 1981), (Stelmach 
and Brozek, 2006). 
There are several instruments for enforcing competition law that 
theoretically could be applied when the specific objectives of increasing 
the transparency and liquidity of energy trade in the wholesale market are 
at stake. Application of those instruments is, however, strictly contingent 
upon specific market assumptions. 
Market structures with a single dominant company or excessive 
concentration and lock–in trading inside vertically integrated energy 
companies are the circumstances that should predispose to a decision to 
implement such tools. 
This section is dedicated to an analysis of competition law and 
regulatory instruments that encourage greater transparency and liquidity 
of energy trade and energy markets and that are possible to apply under 
national and EU law. For the reason of proper classification of those 
instruments, one has to begin with a review of the remedies applied in 
order to enforce competition law, which in general may be divided into 
two groups: behavioural and structural (Table 1). 
 
Table	  1.	  Types	  of	  Remedies	  in	  Competition	  Law	  and	  their	  Examples	  
BEHAVIOURAL	  REMEDIES	   	   STRUCTURAL	  REMEDIES	  
Granting	  access	  to	  an	  infrastructure	   	  
Change	  or	  withdrawal	  of	  contract	  
conditions	  
Change	  of	  prices	  or	  rebates	  
Order	  to	  terminate	  the	  contract	  
Order	  to	  exchange	  the	  information	  
Divestiture	  of	  part	  or	  total	  of	  shares	   	  
Divestiture	  of	  the	  organised	  part	  of	  the	  
undertaking	  or	  assets	   	  
Divestiture	  of	  subsidiary	  
Order	  for	  division	  of	  company	  
Source:	  own	  analysis	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When mentioning the procedure of imposing remedies, we have in 
mind proceedings described and allowed for by EU competition law, 
which in general intends that an antitrust authority require that an 
undertaking actively takes certain measures proportional to the declared 
infringements (Hellstrom et al., 2009). 
Undoubtedly both structural and behavioural instruments have certain 
advantages and certain disadvantages that make them particularly useful 
for specific issues (see Table 2). In the area of competition law behavioural 
remedies address the conduct of the undertakings by imposing duties and 
constraints on their behaviour. It is a commonly held view in the literature 
that a crucial strength of behavioural remedies is that they do not modify 
the structure of an undertaking and are therefore deemed able to deal with 
the competition concern in a more flexible, and less draconian, way 
(Tajana, 2006). 
 
Table	  2.	  Pros	  and	  Cons	  of	  Structural	  and	  Behavioural	  Remedies	   	  
	   ADVANTAGES	   DISADVANTAGES	  
Structural	  
remedies	  
"Directly"	  effective	  
More	  difficult	  to	  circumvent	  
Relatively	  easy	  to	  administer	  
Take	  effect	  quickly	  
Pose	  unnecessary	  transaction	  costs	  
Costly	  if	  inefficient	  
Potential	  damage	  to	  innocent	  third	  
parties	   	  
Reduce	  the	  incentive	  to	  compete	  
vigorously	  
Behavioural	  
remedies	  
More	  respectful	  of	  proportionality	  
and	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  parties	   	  
More	  flexible	  
Do	  not	  properly	  address	  the	  excessive	  
concentration	  of	  market	  power	  
Costly	  and	  burdensome	  to	  monitor	  
and	  implement	  
Source:	  Tajana	  (2006).	  
 
In practice, behavioural remedies quite often (esp. in the case of 
commitment decisions) bring far reaching consequences for a company, 
especially when the ambition of the antitrust authority is not simply to 
execute competition law, but also to regulate the market. It is, however, 
worth mentioning that a disadvantage of taking only behavioural 
remedies is that firms may still have incentives to avoid compliance. As a 
result complementary instruments shall be also considered for potential 
implementation. 
Both behavioural and structural instruments are used by the 
competition authorities in cases of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TfEU) 
and in cases of mergers and acquisitions. However in certain 
circumstances (described in the following section) they might be and are 
applied in cases of sector-specific regulation, which is a quite 
understandable situation considering the fact that the selection of 
measures designed to create a common energy market in the EU was 
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based on a presumption of the necessity for a quick application of 
competition in the energy market, as well as by the means of adopting 
directives that contain competition law remedies (e.g. Third Party Access, 
Unbundling). 
When dealing with remedies that could theoretically be applied in the 
regulation of the electricity wholesale market, one of the sources of 
inspiration might be the antitrust proceedings conducted by the EU 
Commission even before adopting the regulations and directives of the 
third liberalisation package and which accompanied the sector inquiry. In 
those cases the Commission imposed remedies that not only restore 
competition but are also intended to develop and deepen it. Taking this 
into account, the remedies imposed were de facto quasi-regulatory 
measures, an approach which is often criticized in the literature (for 
instance in (Hancher and de Vlam, 2004)). Behavioural remedies were the 
subject of a number of the Commission’s commitment decisions, which 
were designed to: 
 
1. increase the liquidity of the markets by limiting the concluding of 
long term energy supply contracts, since this category of contract leads to 
the exclusion of competitors (Distrigas, EdF, Electrabel);  
2. granting access to essential facilities for competitors, including the 
transmission and distribution networks and gas storage installations 
owned by dominant undertakings (E.ON, RWE, GdF Suez)  
3. deepening market integration by limiting the reservation of 
interconnector capacity by dominant undertakings (ENI, SvK) 
(Kloc-Evison and Koska, 2010). 
 
The circumstances analysed here will refer to cases described in the first 
of the groups listed above. In our opinion a good example of a remedy 
that increases the liquidity of the markets by limiting the effects of 
long-term contracts is the decision adopted by the Commission in the 
Distrigas case (Bellantuono, 2009), (Spanjer, 2009) 
(COMP/B-1/37.966—Distrigas). This case concerned long term gas supply 
contracts in Belgium. In its preliminary assessment, the Commission 
expressed (on the basis of then art. 82 of the Treaty, now art. 102 TfEU) 
concerns that long term gas supply contracts with large industrial 
customers concluded by Distrigas may render it impossible for those 
customers to switch to another supplier and moreover limit the 
possibilities for other gas suppliers to conclude contracts, excluding them 
from the market. The commitments proposed by Distrigas and approved 
by the Commission are presented in Table 3. 
The Distrigas case, where the Commission tried to improve the 
situation of industrial customers who were bound by long term contracts, 
is an example of applying a very interesting instrument i.e. a duty to 
release gas (or gas release programme). 
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Table	  3.	  Commitments	  Proposed	  by	  Distrigas	  and	  Approved	  by	  the	  Commission	  
DISTRIGAS	  COMMITMENT	   TYPE	  OF	  REMEDY	  
On	  average	  a	  minimum	  of	  70	  %	  of	  the	  gas	  volumes	  
supplied	  by	  Distrigas	  and	  connected	  undertakings	  
to	  industrial	  users	  and	  electricity	  producers	  in	  
Belgium	  will	  return	  to	  the	  market	  each	  year.	  If	  
Distrigas'	  total	  sales	  decrease	  from	  their	  2007	  level,	  
then	  Distrigas	  will	  be	  able	  to	  tie	  a	  certain	  fixed	  
volume	  of	  gas	  sales,	  which	  represents	  less	  than	  20	  
%	  of	  the	  total	  market	  concerned	  
Duty	  to	  release	  certain	  gas	  
volumes	   	  
Contracts	  with	  industrial	  users	  and	  electricity	  
producers	  cannot	  be	  longer	  than	  five	  years,	  
however	  contracts	  relating	  to	  new	  power	  plants	  
with	  a	  capacity	  exceeding	  10	  MW	  are	  not	  subject	  
to	  the	  commitments	  
Restriction	  of	  length	  of	  contracts	  
(with	  de	  minimis	  exception)	   	  
Distrigas	  commits	  itself	  not	  to	  conclude	  any	  gas	  
supply	  agreements	  with	  resellers	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  
over	  two	  years	  
Duty	  not	  to	  conclude	  a	  contract	  
with	  reseller	  for	  a	  certain	  time	   	  
Distrigas	  confirms	  that	  it	  will	  not	  introduce	  use	  
restrictions	  into	  its	  supply	  contracts.	  
General	  duty	  not	  to	  put	  
restrictions	  in	  supply	  contracts	   	  
Source:	  own	  based	  on	  Distrigas	  commitment	  decision	  
 
This remedy consists of a commitment by the dominant seller to release 
onto the market gas from long term contracts and offer it to other market 
players. Such a measure, though interfering with the contract obligations, 
brings potential advantages through increasing the liquidity of the market 
and limiting barriers to entry. The Distrigas case concerns the gas market 
but this type of action also applies (and was also applied) to the electricity 
market, though in slightly different form as the techno-economic character 
of the electricity market is different.  
A measure that is specifically designed to promote competition in the 
electricity market and has been relatively often applied to it is the Virtual 
Power Plant (VPP) auction, described as: sales of electricity capacity 
which, rather than “physical” divestitures, are “virtual” divestitures by 
one or more dominant firms in a market. Instead of selling the physical 
power plant, the firm retains management and control of the plant, but 
offers contracts that are intended to replicate the output of the plant. 
Typically, these contracts are sold as divisible goods of varying durations, 
offered in periodic open and transparent auctions (Ausubel and Cramton, 
2010). This type of auction was applied for example in the EDF case as a 
behavioural measure to be used while assessing EDF’s intention of 
purchase 1/3 of the shares of the German utility EnBW, and to do that 
EDF agreed to make 6 000 MW of virtual capacity available in France in 
order to increase competition in the market. EDF was at the time selling to 
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around 90% of the so-called free consumers in the French market (Schultz, 
2005).  
What makes VPP close to our case are the essential characteristics taken 
into account by the regulators when adopting decisions on VPP, which 
are: 
 
• facilitating entry into the electricity market by assuring the 
availability of electricity supplies on the high-power grid to new entrants; 
• promoting the development of and adding liquidity to the 
wholesale electricity market; and 
• reducing market power in the spot electricity market (Ausubel and 
Cramton, 2010). 
 
Similar essential characteristics were considered before the introduction 
of the PX duty to trade that we analyse in this article.   
Examples of the solutions mentioned above (namely gas release and the 
VPP auctions) are mainly applied by the competition authorities as 
remedies in the course of proceedings against dominant companies and 
during assessment of mergers and acquisitions. The use of such remedies 
in the framework of sector specific regulation is authorized by both 
market directives (2009/72, 2009/73), which, among other powers of 
NRAs, lay down the power to carry out investigations into the functioning 
of the electricity markets, and to decide upon and impose any necessary 
and proportionate measures to promote effective competition and ensure 
the proper functioning of the market. This regulation provides the basis 
for establishing the powers of NRAs in national law, which might raise 
some concerns in terms of their relations with competition law. The EU 
law here refers to effective competition and proper functioning of the 
market, which are naturally associated with a competition law regime. 
Literature and specialists claim in general that the implementation of 
those regulations may assume the form of specific national provisions on 
virtual power plants or gas release programmes that apply to concentrated 
markets with historically incumbent undertakings that preserve their 
rights resulting from long term import contracts (Cabau, 2010). In the case 
of VPP this is indirectly confirmed by the recital 37 of preamble to 
directive 2009/72, which stipulates that: The establishment of virtual 
power plants — electricity release programmes whereby electricity 
undertakings are obliged to sell or to make available a certain volume of 
electricity or to grant access to part of their generation capacity to 
interested suppliers for a certain period of time — is one of the possible 
measures that can be used to promote effective competition and ensure 
the proper functioning of the market. It should be underlined that in this 
provision EU law equates VPP to electricity release programmes which are 
based on imposing on the incumbent dominant company an electricity 
sale obligation in favour of competitors to render it possible for them to 
enter the market (Chatonet al., 2010). Implementing the possibilities 
offered by art. 37(4)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC and art. 41(4)(b) of 
Directive 2009/73/EC are not only limited to VPP and gas release 
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programmes but may also be related to specific programmes concerning 
particular subsectors, like e.g. storage or transmission (Commission 2010). 
In our opinion, those provisions, however, do not restrict national 
legislators to regulating only such programmes as are mentioned above. 
One should consider that Member States (taking into account specific 
national market conditions) may on the grounds of those provisions also 
regulate for other instruments that are designed to promote effective 
competition and ensure the proper functioning of the market, while taking 
into account the proportionality and adequacy rules. Thus, the 3rd 
liberalization package offers the basis for applying remedies in sector 
specific regulation that are borrowed from competition law. 
In theory the possible effects of consolidation on the behaviour of a 
company in the retail and wholesale markets rely on several parameters. 
A recent study by (Bunn et al., 2015) lists among the others the following: 
risk aversion of retail companies, as well as the relative concentration in 
the retail and wholesale market [see (Bunn et al., 2015) for further 
discussion]. 
2.2 Introduction of the PX Duty to Trade into the Energy Law 
 
In section 1 we argued, that in 2008 - 2010 there were grounds for state 
intervention concerning the malfunctioning of the electricity market. 
Although the process of adjusting the market should have been 
commenced either by Parliament or the Government, it was the energy 
regulator who was most interested and active in intensifying competition 
in the electricity sector. The 2010 amendment to the Energy law, which 
included provisions concerning the PX duty to trade, was a difficult 
process, mostly due to the reluctant position of government. 
One of basic arguments against the introduction of PX duty to trade 
was a concern about the monopolizing of the wholesale trade exclusively 
by one power exchange. Those arguments were raised both by politicians 
and smaller trading platforms that were afraid of the largest entity, 
POLPX, dominating the trade. It was not understandable on what grounds 
this reasoning was based, as the functioning of a single PX is a natural 
state for several power markets due to: 
 
• the specificity of exchange fares, that favour larger markets; 
• a higher level of liquidity, which is the value of an exchange to a 
participant (Frontier, 2005). 
 
In consequence of this, in most European countries there exists only one 
power exchange. Concerns were also raised with regard to the restriction 
of investment in the generation sector, which argued that only OTC 
contracts may be credible collateral for bank credits (see: A letter of EFET 
to the Minister of Economy (8.12.2017)). 
It was even more difficult to get this accepted since it was not stipulated 
in European law, which states no duties on Member States in that respect 
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regarding implementation (Muras and Elzanowski 2010). Polish energy 
law closely follows the EU Energy directives and arguments for means of 
implementation could make a legislative proposal easier to accept by 
policymakers. A certain analogy may be detected in the measures that can 
be used to promote effective competition and ensure the proper 
functioning of the market, which may be adopted by the Member States, 
according to recital 37 of the preamble to Directive 2009/72/EC. This 
provision refers rather (as we argued above) to VPP and the gas release 
programmes as individual measures, while the PX duty to trade concerns 
the whole energy market, and may be described as an example of a 
measure supporting liquidity which reinforces the position of the power 
exchange (Meeus, 2010).  Thus, the solution adopted was not based on 
the explicit norms of the EU directives, rather it was a specific instrument 
in support of the market liberalisation process, introduced by national law 
as a reaction to serious competition concerns regarding the Polish energy 
market (Swora, 2013). 
Regarding the introduction of PX duty to trade, in 2009 - 2010, one 
could also consider using the tools provided in competition law. The 
problem was that the Polish competition authority (President of the Office 
of Competition and Consumer Protection, hereinafter: POCCP), did not 
have a proper cause for action  (like a merger case or other case with a 
view to issuing a commitment decision) and what is even more significant 
- specific knowledge on how the electricity market functions. On the other 
hand, having such specific knowledge, the PERO was not equipped with 
powers that could have effectively improved the situation on the market. 
As a consequence, a remedy such as VPP auctions could not have been 
applied. In such a case, the only thing to do was to refer the matter to 
government to try to persuade it of the necessity to initialise the legislative 
procedure (Fig. 8). 
In 2009-2010 there were good grounds for proposing changes that could 
have improved the malfunctioning electricity market, as prices were high 
and industrial energy users argued that such a situation might cause 
bankruptcies (esp. in energy intensive industries). A good occasion to 
introduce such a change was during the process of amending the Energy 
Law, which commenced in 2009. Eventually, the PX duty to trade was 
regulated in the Act of 8 January 2010 amending the Energy Law of 2007.  
The PX duty to trade stipulated in art. 49a of the Energy Law is of a 
general character. It applies to every participant operating in the 
generation sector, which is obliged to sell at least 15% of the electricity 
generated in a particular year through the power exchange. However, a 
specific obligation is imposed on generators covered by the programme 
for the terminating of long term contracts (hereinafter: ex-LTA generators) 
who have to offer the whole volume of electricity produced in a given year 
in power exchanges.  
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Fig.	  8.	  Division	  of	  Powers	  and	  Competition	  in	  Energy	  Markets	  
 
Source:	  own	  analysis	  
 
This aggravated rigour was the consequence of the necessity of 
obtaining the correct state aid clearance that was granted in favour of 
those generators who voluntarily terminated their long term contracts. It 
may be questioned however whether the obligation was correctly 
targeted, taking into account the abovementioned specificity of the Polish 
power generation market which was dominated by one energy holding 
(PGE SA). The obligation was imposed on all market participants, 
regardless of their market share. However, the instrument was imposed 
mainly to the incumbent generators (units) that are to benefit from aid in 
respect of stranded cost. They are obliged to sell 100% of electricity via 
PolPX for as long as they received the aid. All the other generators (each 
unit treated independently) are obliged to sell only 15% in the spot 
market. Consequently, these producers are able to hedge risk in the 
forward markets, such as the Commodity Forward Instruments Market 
with physical delivery. In these cases price formation can take place either 
in the power exchange or in bilateral transactions, as forward contracting 
outside the PolPX is not forbidden. 
An example of a more targeted measure is the provision of art. 111 of 
the Hungarian Electricity Act 2007, according to which the obligation to 
sell in the power exchange market may be imposed on market players 
having significant market power in the wholesale market. The energy 
regulator conducts an assessment of significant market power (equivalent 
to a dominant position) in the relevant markets. Hungarian electricity law 
also includes another interesting instrument (to the best of our knowledge 
never applied by the energy regulator), which applies to all generators 
above 20 MW and traders with available free capacity and obliges them to 
sell their free capacities scheduled for the next year under an open and 
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transparent procedure. This obligation may be carried out by selling 
capacities through power exchange markets. 
Comparing Hungarian and Polish provisions on PX duty to trade 
(exchange trade obligation), one may isolate two models of PX duty to 
trade (the exchange trade obligation, this measure): 
 
1. a   general   obligation   –   imposed   on   all   entities   in   the   generation  
sector;  
2. targeted   obligations   –   imposed   on   certain   parts   of   the   generation  
sector  (e.g.  ex-­‐‑LTA  generators)  or  a  dominant  firm.  
 
Regarding the implementation of both models, where entities are 
defined in general terms in statutes (like is the case with the general 
(exchange trade obligation) PX duty to trade or in targeted obligations 
which concern ex-LTA generators), there is no need for an additional 
decision of the NRA, which is only supervising the execution of the duty 
and may impose a sanction.  
In the case of targeted obligations imposed on a dominant company it is 
first of all crucial to define the relevant market that the regulator feels 
should be the subject of an individual decision. This means that in a 
typical situation the procedure is of considerable length, although there is 
the unquestionable advantage of the more tailored features of a targeted 
obligation measure. 
Referring back to the scope of the obligation, it should be assumed that 
the choice of covering a wide spectrum of market participants and not 
only the dominant undertaking was due to the economies foreseen in 
implementing the law and the conservative approach of (at least some) 
policymakers. 
The Polish Energy Law does not envisage individual powers of the 
regulator to decide upon and impose any necessary and proportionate 
measures to promote effective competition and ensure the proper 
functioning of the market (Article 37(4)b of Directive 2009/72/EC). One of 
the reasons for this omission is the rather strict approach to the division of 
powers between the systems of energy regulation and protection of 
competition. 
The Polish antitrust authority is traditionally very reluctant to share its 
competences with the energy market regulator. This approach was very 
clearly presented during the discussions on the amendment to the Energy 
Law 2007 and the new energy and gas laws (drafts from 2012) that were 
supposed to implement the provisions of Directives 2009/72/EC and 
2009/73/EC. 
Finally, the amendment did not contain regulations on powers, which 
would enable the NRA to impose individual measures aimed at ensuring 
the proper functioning of the gas market (Swora, 2013). In consequence, 
the Polish energy market regulator – unlike the telecommunications 
market regulator – has no powers to carry out assessments of significant 
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market power and impose regulatory duties on companies holding such 
power (Wach, 2011). 
 
Table	  4.	  A	  Comparison	  of	  Pro-­‐liquidity	  Remedies	  
REMEDY	  
EXPECTED	  
EFFECT	  
SUBJECT	   BASIS	   MECHANISM	  
GAS	  RELEASE	  
PROGRAMM
E	  
More	  
liquidity,	  
lower	  
barriers	  to	  
entry	  
	  
Energy	  
company	  
holding	  
dominant	  
position	  
Decision	  
of	  
Antitrust	  
Authority	  
Contractual/auctions/auctio
ns	  on	  PXs	  
VPP	  
More	  
liquidity,	  
lower	  
barriers	  to	  
entry	  
	  
Energy	  
company	  
holding	  
dominant	  
position	  
Decision	  
of	  
Antitrust	  
Authority	  
Auction	  
HUNGARIAN	  
PX	  DTT	  
More	  
liquidity,	  
lower	  
barriers	  to	  
entry	  
Energy	  
company	  
with	  
significant	  
market	  
power	  
	  
Decision	  
of	  NRA	  
(SMP)	  
Power	  exchange	  
POLISH	  PX	  
DTT	  
More	  
liquidity,	  
more	  
transparenc
y,	  limitation	  
of	  insider	  
trading	  
Every	  
generator/LT
A	  generators-­‐	  
programme	  
beneficiaries	  
Ex	  lege	  
(NRA	  
monitors	  
and	  
imposes	  
sanctions
)	  
Power	  exchange	  
Source:	  own	  analysis	  
 
The PX duty to trade through the power exchange is not absolute as 
there are certain exceptions, either directly stated in the Energy Law (ex 
lege) or determined by the NRA through its decisions issued on the legal 
basis as stipulated in Energy Law (Table 5). Those exceptions are mostly 
justified on technical and economic grounds and are the consequence of 
the specific features of generating sources. Moreover, taking into account 
concerns about investment stability, the Polish legislator also excluded 
energy sold on the basis of contracts that are collaterals to obligations 
resulting from contracts concluded with financial institutions. An 
important condition is that the exception granted by the NRA’s decision 
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may only apply if it will not result in a serious disruption of competition 
on the energy or balancing markets. There were only few individual 
exceptions granted by PERO on these grounds. 
 
Table	  5.	  Exceptions	  from	  the	  Obligation	  in	  2012	  
EXCEPTIONS	  EX	  LEGE	   	   SHARE	  
energy	  provided	  by	  the	  generator	  to	  the	  final	  customer	  via	  direct	  
line	   	  
0%	  
energy	  generated	  from	  RES	  (renewable	  energy	  sources)	   13%	  
energy	  generated	  in	  CHP	  with	  a	  defined	  average	  efficiency	  
(>52,5%)	  
38%	  
energy	  used	  by	  the	  generator	  for	  its	  own	  purposes	   27%	  
energy	  necessary	  for	  electricity	  system	  operators	  to	  perform	  their	  
statutory	   	   tasks	   	   17%	  
energy	  generated	  in	  a	  plant	  that	  has	  a	  total	  installed	  electrical	  
power	  <	  50	  MW	   0%	  
EXCEPTIONS	  BY	  THE	  DECISION	  OF	  PERO	   SHARE	  
energy	  sold	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  execution	  of	  long	  term	  obligations	  
deriving	  from	  contracts	  concluded	  with	  financial	  institutions	  in	  
order	  to	  realize	  investments	  related	  to	  electricity	  generation;	  
energy	  generated	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  TSO	  and	  used	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  correct	  functioning	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  
5%	  
Source:	  own	  based	  on	  ERO	  (2013).	  
 
The generators submit reports regarding trade on the PX, based on art. 
49a(9) of the Energy Law as PERO supervises the execution of the 
exchange obligation. A financial penalty may be imposed by PERO on a 
generator in case of failure to fulfil the obligation.  
It may prima facie raise constitutional concerns that imposing a specific 
way of energy trading on energy companies can constitute a violation of 
their freedom to carry on economic activity. 
In our opinion, competition in the electricity market is the value that 
overbalances these concerns in so far as the duties imposed proportionally 
address market imperfections and bring liquidity and transparency. As 
the economic analysis proves, the successful introduction of market 
reforms results in increasing competition, hence reduces dead weight loss, 
and improves the social surplus. As an example, an analysis that was 
carried out with the employment of the computable model based on the 
Cournot approach improved by the inclusion of Conjectural Variations 
(Kamiński, 2011) showed that market power in the Polish power 
generation sector has a significant impact on wholesale electricity prices 
and production volumes. The result confirmed that under the competitive 
scenario the average wholesale electricity price would be approximately 
6.5 €/MWh lower when compared to the reference scenario. The dead 
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weight welfare loss was estimated at the level of 123.6 M€ annually 
(Kamiński, 2011). 
3 Results and Discussion 
The introduction of the PX duty to trade caused a huge drop in 
in-group electricity trade, to approx. 25% in 2011 and 2012 in the case of 
hard coal-based power producers and plummeted to almost zero in the 
case of brown coal-fired power generators (Fig. 2). 
Consequently the power exchange had already become a key 
power-trading platform in 2011. While in 2009 the sale of electricity 
through the power exchange was practically negligible regardless of 
whether it related to hard- or brown coal-based power production, in 2010 
it amounted to 4.2% and it reached 58.7% in 2011. 
Bilateral contracts accounted for less than 40% of all forms of wholesale 
trade, whereas in the year before this the share amounted to 89.8%. The 
remaining sales were mostly carried out through the balancing market 
and power was only sold to foreign buyers to a limited extent (ERO 2012). 
In 2012, the number of commercial transactions carried out through the 
power exchange increased to 61.8% of the volume of electricity sold by 
generators (ERO 2013). The changes in the crucial years 2010-2011 are 
depicted in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig.	  9.	  Shares	  of	  Electricity	  Markets	  -­‐	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Introduction	  of	  the	  PX	  Duty	  
to	  Trade	  (2010-­‐2011)	  
  
Source:	  ERO	  (2013).	  
 
A more detailed analysis shows that hard coal-fired power generators 
sold practically 60% of their electricity through the power exchange while 
the brown coal ones increased the share of PX trade to 73% in 2011, and to 
82% in 2012 (Fig. 10). 
 
 
OTC	in-group	
trade			
72,20%	
OTC	others	
17,60%	
Power	exchange		
4,20%	
Other	sales		
6%	
2010	
Power	
exchange	
58,70%	
OTC	in-group	
trade;	
18,90%	OTC	others	
18,30%	
Other	sales	
4,10%	
2011	
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Fig.	  10.	  The	  Share	  of	  Electricity	  Trade	  Through	  the	  Power	  Exchange	  [%]	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
As far as prices are concerned, there is a substantial price convergence 
observed after the introduction of the obligation. While in 2010 the 
difference between hard and brown coal-fired generation prices was 
approx. 3.87 EUR/MWh, in 2011 it was 1.11 EUR/MWh, and in 2012 it 
was only 0.72 EUR/MWh (Fig. 4). That observation is typical of a situation 
where there is a high share of trade via a power exchange, as there is only 
one clearing price regardless of technology or fuel. Therefore, there is no 
technological differentiation that theoretically could be taken into account 
in bilateral contracts. That outcome is of crucial importance because now 
the more expensive hard coal-based power plants are forced to increase 
their economic efficiency (cut costs) in order to be competitive in the 
electricity market. There is another fact supporting this observation, 
resulting from a comparison of hard coal-fired generation prices and costs. 
While the LRMC costs2 of those power plants increased by 8.4% in 2012 
(in comparison with 2011), the price of electricity dropped only by 1.4%. 
Moreover, the analysis of the Lerner Index based on LRMC shows that in 
the case of hard coal power plants, after the introduction of PX duty to 
trade, the value of the Lerner Index dropped from 0.1 in 2010, to 0.05 in 
2011, and -0.04 in 2012. The negative value of the Lerner Index means 
those power plants generate losses on electricity production. Another 
consequence is that brown coal power generation takes advantage of 
lower costs hence their LRMC-based Lerner Index maintains a level of 0.3, 
which is very high (Fig. 11). This situation could change if CO2 permits 
become more expensive, as brown coal-fired power generation emits more 
CO2 per MWh, therefore they would be exposed to a higher cost burden 
resulting from the ETS. 
 
                                                
2 Please note that in the calculations extra marginal plants are not taken into account and 
only those plants that were dispatched are included. 
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Fig.	  11.	  Lerner	  Index	  Based	  on	  LRMC	  
 
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
An analysis of the SRMC-based Lerner Index further confirms the 
previous findings. The introduction of the PX duty to trade intensified the 
decline in its values in 2012 in the case of hard coal-based power 
generation (to approx. 0.22), with CHPs producing a similar outcome. It is 
worth noting that brown coal-fired power generators managed to keep the 
price-cost margin at the level of 0.54, which is a huge value, in particular 
when compared to other technologies (Fig. 12). 
 
Fig.	  12.	  Lerner	  Index	  Based	  on	  SRMC	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  Energy	  Statistics	  
 
These results all confirm that this way of trading electricity has been 
accepted by the participants in the wholesale market. This fact is also 
confirmed by the official position of the Association of Energy Trading 
(Towarzystwo Obrotu Energią – TOE), a voluntary, self-governing and 
apolitical non-profit organisation established in 2003. This association, 
although initially reluctant to support the PX duty to trade, assessed the 
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introduction in 2012 in the following way: while TOE is somewhat 
concerned about the administrative obligation imposed on generators to 
sell electricity through a prescribed trading platform, the experience so far 
is positive, with greater liquidity in the market, more credible price 
indexes and the Electricity Commodity Exchange becoming increasingly 
user-friendly (TOE, 2012). Also the current President of the ERO 
concluded that: the obligation to electricity generators to sell generated 
electricity through the power exchange, which came into effect on 9 
August 2010 under Article 49a of the Energy Law, brought about the 
expected effects (ERO, 2012). The effects that were achieved owing to the 
introduction of the PX duty to trade can be summarised as follows: 
 
• ensuring equal access by market participants to electricity traded in 
Poland by ensuring equal conditions of participation in power exchange 
trading; 
• ensuring transparency of electricity trading by guaranteeing equal 
access to information inter alia on electricity prices and conditions for 
participation in electricity trading; 
• ensuring accurate prices of electricity by directing a large part of the 
wholesale electricity trading into an organized market which is the 
Commodity Exchange, while maintaining supervision by the Financial 
Supervision Commission. This supervision is supposed to eliminate the 
possibility of manipulation of electricity prices - especially in a market 
such as one in which there are companies with a strong market position; 
• simplifying the energy trade process from the perspective of 
consumers, hence increasing their position and strength in the electricity 
market; 
• ensuring the safety of the settlement of financial transactions by a 
licensed Warsaw Commodity Clearing House (ERO, 2012). 
 
Even if we assume that PERO as the author of the idea of the PX duty to 
trade could not present a view other than positive, the economic facts and 
general approval of market players, leads us to a positive assessment of 
this specific regulatory measure. 
 
4 Conclusions  
PX duty to trade belongs to the family of regulatory measures that may 
be applied to improve liquidity and transparency in the wholesale 
electricity and/or gas markets. Implementation of PX duty to trade was an 
appropriate response to serious problems that were affecting the Polish 
electricity market in 2008 – 2009, namely the (i) lack of transparency of the 
power trade, (ii) negative effects of vertical integration, (iii) horizontal 
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consolidation, (iv) termination of the LTAs, (v) deregulation of prices for 
industrial customers and (vi) lack of credible price indexes. Those issues, 
in addition to increasing coal prices, have caused the dynamic increase in 
energy prices. The mechanism that was sought was supposed to put such 
a difficult market situation in order. One of the solutions debated was to 
introduce administrative measures and strengthen price control, but 
finally it was decided to accept arrangements that were supposed to 
improve competition: the introduction of PX duty to trade. Adoption of 
this pro–market measure during the financial crises, when proposals to 
reregulate the market are more likely to be on the top of the politicians’ 
wish list, was not an obvious choice; but it worked. The ultimate effect of 
the legislative changes was a greater liquidity and transparency in the 
market and a reliable price index. PX duty to trade, classified as an 
example of liquidity supporting measures, though initially being 
questioned and opposed by the market participants, was finally accepted, 
which may be confirmed by the volumes traded on the PX. 
Energy covered by the PX duty to trade (at least 15% generated by all 
producers and 100% generated by producers who used to be bound by an 
LTA) translates into 74.8 TWh, which is approximately 51% of the gross 
electricity generated by those companies. According to 2012 data, 
generators sold 81.5 TWh (out of a total electricity production in Poland of 
150 TWh) through the power exchange. Taking into account the 
exceptions it is quite clear that the energy generators internalised the 
obligation to sell energy through the power exchange which became not 
just an unwanted administrative burden but also an accepted market 
mechanism. As far as the economic results are concerned, improved 
competition in the electricity market forced hard coal-based power 
generators to reduce prices, which translated to a significant drop in the 
value of the Lerner Index. For those power generators the LRMC-based 
Lerner Index plummeted to -0.04, and the SRMC-based one to 0.22. Such 
low price-cost margins have never been observed in the Polish power 
market. Additionally there has been a substantial convergence of prices, 
and the differences between hard and brown coal-fired generation prices 
are only of the order of 0.7 EUR/MWh. 
On the other hand, it has to be pointed out that PX duty to trade did not 
change the competitive situation on the supply side of the market, as it did 
not bring in new entrants. It also did not diminish the market power of the 
dominant player, which results from cost differences between hard and 
brown coal-fired power generation. Individually applied VPP auctions 
would surely be more effective in this respect. However, it worked on the 
demand side, creating a more liquid and transparent wholesale market 
and new opportunities for traders. Regulation of the possibility to apply 
for an exemption when there is a need to guarantee a bank loan was 
protected against objections regarding the anti-investment character of 
that measure (such objections were presented e.g. by critics of the gas 
release programme in Distrigas). Last but not least, a competitive 
wholesale market has been created, enabling proper settlement of 
compensation of terminated LTAs. And although there are other 
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upcoming issues that the Polish electricity market will have to face, the 
instrument discussed in this paper may serve as an example of a relatively 
successful remedy. The real test for the power exchange, which is one of 
beneficiaries of applying this instrument, will come when the volume of 
electricity being a subject of the duty is diminished and wholesale energy 
trading will be subjected to a wider competition between various market 
places. . Another important test for the instrument we have examined in 
this paper is development of the EU regional markets that is a process that 
will significantly change rules of the game in the wholesale energy 
markets in the EU. 
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